توضیح

یادداشت: عنوان فارسی: فقه اسلامی به مثابه گفتمان اخلاقی: پژوهشی در ماهیت استدلال اخلاقی در نظریه حقوقی اسلامی.
This article seeks to develop a better understanding of the normative nature of moral reasoning in Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh). This theory is built on a foundational proposition suggesting that moral evaluation must conform to the divine will, which aims to achieve an ethical state of affairs expressed as maṣlaḥa (social good). Jurists use notions of maṣlaḥa to interpret revelatory norms and make new rules to guide moral choices in applied ethics. However, very little is known about maṣlaḥa’s underlying nature of ethical value and normative content. In modern Islamic studies, maṣlaḥa is commonly understood in consequentialist/utilitarian terms. In situations of moral uncertainty, Muslims should aim to promote choices that maximize the good. In this article, I offer three insights into the nature of moral reasoning in Islamic legal theory. First, I show that the common consequentialist/utilitarian thesis of Islamic moral reasoning is unsustainable. Second, both classic and modern Islamic jurisprudence introduced two conflicting visions of Islamic moral reasoning. One is rooted in rudimentary consequentialist approach while the other seems to contemplate deontological normativity in the Islamic system of ethics. Finally, I argue that the way forward is to reconcile these conflicting views in one hybrid normative framework to guide our understanding of the content of ethical value and normativity in Islamic legal theory. In this framework, I understand maṣlaḥa as comprising first-order deontological principles to provide categorical protection for basic human needs while leaving room for consequentialist calculations of the right action.